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CHAPTER I 
THE NATURE OF MUTINY, AN INTRODUCTION 
Mut iny is as old as authority and it may last as long as authority 
last s .  What is mut iny? Webster ' s  New Int ernat ional Dict ionary of the 
Engl ish Language defines it as such: 
Violent collllllot ion; tumult; strife , 
Insurrect ion against,  or refus al to obey , 
const ituted authority, part icularly.milit ary or 
naval authority, concert ed revolt against the 
rules of discip l ine or the lawful collllllands of 
a super ior officer; henc e ,  generally forcible 1 
res istance to rightful author ity; insubordinat ion . 
For another definit ion of the YJOrd mut iny, The Encyc lopedia of the 
Social S ciences says , "In old French mut iny meant any .kind of s edit ion 
2 
or consp irat ive upris ing of a revolut ionary nature.  11 Fuller s ays mutiny 
i s  personal , int imat e ,  ·and strong men p l ay leading rol e s .  3 
In mast cases o:f :.muftQ.ya man is not only 
acquainted with , but is in some manner of working 
relationship with t�e p ersons against Yjhom the 
mut iny is direct ed, 
The normal obj ect ives of mut ines are: 
1 
The comp lete overthrow of the exist ing 
colllllland and the p lac ing at the disposal of the 
revolut ionary cause of the sh ip or guns s e ized 
by the mut ineers . s 
C, Nei lson,  Editor - in-Chief, New International Dict ionary of the 
English Language (Springfield:  1942�p .  16 1 7 .  
21'Mut iny,�1 The Encyclopedia of the Soc ial S ciences ( 19 3 3) , XI, p . 166 . 
3Edmund Fuller, Mut iny (New York: Crown Pub lishers , 1953) , p .  xii.  
4Ib id .  
511Mut iny, " ££.• cit . ,  p .  166 . 
2 
The forms and charact eristics of mutiny are n1.llllerous , The 
fol lowing characteris t ic s  may be found : ( 1) h ighly dramat ic and chiefly 
asso ciated with the sea,* but armies have it ; ( 2) may be the spark tliat 
sets off a revo lution; (3)  the more vigorous the author ity the more 
6 v io l ent the mut iny; (4) may b e  spontaneous or b.rew for months . Mut iny 
has three forms: ( 1 )  mass disobedience ; ( 2) collective pas s ive 
res istance;  ( 3) phys ical assaults .7 Of course,  group act ion is important 
because of the severity of the punishment that is generally lianiled out . 
A mut iny is,  generally, doomed to failure unless  the mut ineers can get 
t�e support of a polit ical ly significant body or sect ion of the c ivil 
or p o l it ical populat ion , 8 
The mut inies at Sp ithead and Nore had some of these  charact eristics,  
but the mut inies were unique and int eresting to this write r .  It was 
remarkab le for its restraint , order, O·rg!'lnizat ion , and it s effect which 
shook the Brit ish Admirality, indeed the nat ion, to it s very foundat ion . 
*Fuller says mut iny is more common in navie s  b ecause: ( 1 )  of the 
hard l ife of the sailors in the old sailing day s ;  ( 2) work on board ship 
was so close and confined .  
6Fuller, .££· c it,, p .  x i .  
7 1'1-lut iny," �· c it . ,  pp , 166 - 16 7 .  
8rb id . 
CHAPTER II 
THE THREATENING EUROPE/iN S ITUATION 
When the news of the mut iny became known, surprise� grief, and 
t error app eared in the fac es of Englishmen; for "the s afety of the realm 
depended on the navy , "1 which was deemed impotent by a mut iny . 
The consequences of these mut inies  can best be illustrat ed by the 
stat ements  .of the fo l lowing distinguished men of the times .  R .  B .  
Sheridan, of the House of Commons ,  said: "If there was , indeed,  a rot in 
the wooden walls of old England , our decay would not be very distant . 112 
In the words of Lord Mornington: 
How discip l ine and subordinat ion are ever again 
to be restored on any p ermanent bas i s , surpasses my 
underst anding to conce iv e . 3 
A lexander Hood, or for our purpose , Lord Br idgeport , the commander of the 
mut inious fleet at Sp ithead, had this to say about the mutiny: "Someone 
connect ed with it almost deserves the over-worked title of Genius . 114 
Like everyone e l s e ,  the commercial and moneyed int erest s  were 
also effect ed.  In January of 1 79 7 ,  the Three Per Cent s were at fifty-
5 seven; and in April,  May, and June they had fal len to forty-sev en.  
1william Hunt , The History of England: From the Acc e s s ion of George 
III  to the Close of Pitt ' s  First Admini st rat ion (New Yo rk: Longi:nans , 
Green ,  and Company , 19 05) , p •
. 
39 0 .  
2charles Knight , The Popular History of England ( London and New 
York :  Frederick Warne and Company, 1883) , VII,  p .  341 . 
3� .  
4Fuller, � ·  c it . ,  p .  42 • 
. 
5 Knight , .2£.•...£.!!.·• p .  342 .  
4 
From this one can deduce the feeling that had be fallen England. 
Mut iny to a nation dependant on sea power fo r safety creates a 
state of alarm; but when the fleet mut inied at Sp ithead and Nore these 
mut inies could have had castastrophic consequences . A look at the 
E uropean scene wil l  tel l o f  the increasing danger that England was to be 
faced with . 
Spain had left the F irst Coalit ion in 179 5 and jo ined France in. 
August, 1796 . (The coalit ion had been fo rmed to combat the French 
Revo lut ion . )  Two months l ater, Spain jo ined with France in w�r on 
6 Kngland. The comb inat ion of these two European powers presented England 
with a formidable foe to face.  
In October of  179 6 ,  Wil liam P it t ,  the Prime Minister of  England, 
sent the Honorable Lord Malmesbury to France to secure a peace sett le-
ment i·iith the French . The terms that were presented by the Engl ish and 
the French are o f  no· concern to th is paper . It will be enough to say 
that there was no peace set t l ement , and the Right Honorab le Lord  
Malmesbury was requested to leave France on a forty-eight hour not ice, 
7 or by December 22,  1796 . The fact that England sent Malmesbury on this 
peace mis s ion seems to indicate how serious the English pos t ion was 
becoming.  
It was , also, during this same perio d of t ime that France s i gned 
a treaty with Nap les . 8 England, whose prob lems were j ust beg�nning to 
start , was slowly being iso lated from her European al lies . 
6E .  H .  Lecky, Engl and in the E ighteenth Century (New York : D .  
App l et on and Company , 1891) ,  VII,  p .  386 . 
7A .  T .  Mahan, Influence o f  Sea Power on the French Revo lution 
(Boston : Little,  Brown, and CompanY:-1898) , I; pp . 240-241. 
8Ib id . ,  p .  218 , 
5 
During the French exp edit ion to Ire land in December o f  1 79 6 ,  and 
January o f  1 79 7 ,  the Engl ish channel fle et was comp let ely ine ffec t iv e .  
I t  was not unt i l  January 3 ,  179 7 ,  that the channel fl eet saPed down the 
channel looking for the French . By this t ime the French had already l e ft 
Bantry Bay and start ed to sail back to France .  For all  intent and 
purpose the English should have s�ayed at Port smouth. For a month they 
sailed after the French fleet , but it was to no avail; they did not even 
sight the enemy .9 
It goes without saying that England should have lost  Ireland to 
the French . For her de fens e ,  England had two guns and tWo thousand 
t roops at Cork to prot ect naval stores wh ich were worth a mill ion and 
a hal f sterl ing . England had only twe lve thousand newly trained Dragoons 
and Fencioles to throw up against Roche ' s  fi fteen thousand wel l-trained 
veterans . The English would have been short work for Hoche and his  
10 vet eran troop s .  The French expedit ion thus failed, but it was not due 
to the e ffort s o f  the Brit ish fl eet . The peop le of  England owed the ir 
. d. . . . d F h . ak l l  s ecuri.ty t o  a iv ine intervent ion an renc mist es .  The  English 
navy "that t rus ted arm o f  national de fense seemed pals ied in every 
1 2  qu·grter . "  
Europ ean event s continued to frustrate England. B y  December 1 ,  
1796, the Brit ish fleet in the Medit erranean reached G ibralt er,  thus 
evacuating this great body of sea. During this evacuat ion , the men o f  
9 Bryant , .2£.• c it . ,  p .  1 7 0 .  
lOib id.  
11Ib id. 
12t-iahan , .2£.• cit . ,  p .  230. 
6 
the fleet were force d to go on one third and one half rations . 13  
Obvious ly, the men endured a great deal of  hardship during the evacuat ion .  
Bonaparte ·was rel ieved t o  see the Engl ish evacuate the Mediterranean . 
Napo leon said, rtthe expuls ion o f  the Eng l ish has had a great effect 
upon the success o f  our military operat ion in Italy . 1114 S ir Gilbert 
E il liot,  a noted author: 
• • • Cons idered a Brit ish F leet in the Mediterranean 
as an essent ial means for securing Italy and Europe 
·from such a mis fortune . 15 
The small island o f  Corsica was also important to the English fleet as 
16 a stat ion for the fleet that was wat ching Toulon, France. It was also 
lost . Bonaparte was already succes s ful at Lonato and Constigl ione and 
thus , by evacuat ing the Mediterranean, a great deal of pressure was taken 
17 o f f  o f  Napo leon. 
Even though·the out look was rather b leak, one bright star does 
appear on the horizon. After reaching Gibralter, Admiral Jervis was 
ordered to Lisbon to prevent the French and Spanish fleets from enter ing 
the Mediterranean and Cadiz . But , before leaving on January 18, his 
fleet was reduced by a furious gale and several o f  his ships were forced 
into the reefs and broken up . Thus , when Jerv is sailed he had on ly t en 
ship s o f  the line . Jervis was also hampered by the fact that Horatio 
13Mahan, .s!E_. c it., pp, 216 -218.  
14 Ibid. 
15 Ib id.  
16 Ib id. 
17 Ib id.  
Nelson ,  his chief Lieutenant , did not catch up with the fleet unt i l  
February 13 , 179 7 . 18 Obviously, the unit ing o f  Nelson's ships was a 
we lcome relief to Admiral Jervis . 
A fter leaving G ibralter, all Jervis was able to do was to break 
up some shipp ing around t .he C ape o f  S t .  Vincent . St i l l  he had not 
7 
sighted any important movements o f  the Spanish or French fleet s .  However, 
he did not have to wait long. 
On February 14 , 179 7 ,  the Spanish fleet was s ighted. It is not 
the purpose of this writer to go into this c las s ic sea battle o f  Cape 
S t .  V incent . However, the .outcome is import ant . The English fleet 
outnumbered , twenty seven to fifteen, clearly  defeated the Spanish 
19 
fleet . Out o f  this great . sea batt le comes the shining star o f  Horatio 
Nel son. Of course, much credit goes to Admiral Jervis for defeating 
a superior in number Spanish fleet . 
The men o f  this fleet were great ly rewarded by the peop le o f  
England . Admiral Jervis was made Earl St . Vincent and Nelson was made 
an Admiral and Knight o f  the Bath . For their part in the b at t le, the 
captains o f  the fleet were given medals and the senior l ieutenant s were 
. . 20 g iven promot ions . . 
Admiral Jervis summed up the s ituation in England at this time by 
• nv.· • 2 1  s ay ing:  a v ictory !i.s very essent ial to England at this moment . "  
181bid. , pp . 219 - 220. 
19 Ib id . , pp . 220-228. 
20ib id . , p .  229 . 
2 1rb id •• p .  228 . 
8 
No doubt Engl ishmen could breath a l it t le easier after thi s ,  but it was 
to be a short repr ieve because the European s ituation was becoming 
more deplorab l e  to the English by the hour. 
On the cont inent , Bonaparte had se ized the l ine o f  Adiage and cut 
o ff the c ity o f  Mantua. A superior fo rce o f  Austrians made three 
attempts  to dis lodge Bonaparte and free the c ity,  but they failed and 
suffered heavy losses in their attempts . From this po int on, Napo leon 
22 
was free to take the o f fens ive, which he prompt ly did. 
The c ity o f  Manuua cap itulated on the second o f  February. This 
then enab led Napo leon to turn on Pope P ius V I .  (February 1 5 ,  1775 -
August 29 , 179 7)  P ius VI had broken an armist ice signed b ack in June 
o f  1796 . However, the Pope was forced to quicllly conc lude another 
armist ice with Napo leon, which was s igned on the nineteenth .  According 
to this armist ice, the Pope was to abandon his right to the Northern 
Prov idences o f  Balogna, Ferrara, Romagna, and was also _forced to cede 
to France, Ancona, a gr.eat sea ·port on the Adriatic sea, for the 
remainder o f  the war. 23 
By March 10, Napo leon was ready to cont inue his advance against 
the Austr ians; he was oppose.cl by the young Archduke Char les o f  Austria -
a gi fted mil itary genius . By March 16 , the French, under the conunand 
o f  Napoleon, had crossed the stream o f  Tagliamento and Is onzo and 
entered the eastern Alp s ,  By the tw�O�Y third o f  March , Napoleon was 
b l  T . 24 a e to enter riesta.  
22Ib id. , pp . 229-230. 
23 Ib id. , p .  233 . 
24Ib id . , p .  234 . 
9 
The mi lit ary po licy o f  the Archduke was to withdraw into Germany, 
a pol icy that Napo leon agreed with ; otherwise ,  as Napoleon said, the 
' 25  Austrians would have . fal len much sooner . 
Napo leon ' s  advances through the mountains o f  Carinthia had a 
great e ffect on the Austrians . ,  By Apr i l  18,  179 7 ,  the preliminaries 
o f  a peace were s igned at Leoben. Thus , hos t i l it ies that started back 
in April  o f  179 2,  ended, at least for the t ime b e ing. 
The armistice p rovided for a:  
• • •  mut ual cessat ion o f  host i lit ies between the 
repub l ic and the emperor, and extended this p rovis ion 
to all  the states o f  the German Emp ire • •  ·aizg 
part icular dominions o f  the emperor himself.  
Austria was al so forced to surrender the Netherlands (Be lguim) and 
"reco gnize the l imit s o f  France as decree d by the laws o f  the Fre,nch 
. 27 repub l ic . "  
In this brief out l ine o f  the peace o f  Leoben: 
Bonaparte,  in dip lomacy had achieved the great 
end o f  h is  campaign. He had separated his enemies . 
in order to be  in position to turn all its fo rce s  28 again st England, and obl ige her to a prompt p eace .  
England's brief ray o f  hope was darkened by this p eace .  At this 
p o int , Great Brit ain depended upon the ab so lut e control of the sea, that 
is - upon.sea po:wer . Shortly a mut iny broke out which threatened to 
b r ing England to her knees . 
25Ibid. 
26 lb id . , p � 23 5 .  
27 Ib id.  
28Ib id., pp . 235-236. 
10 
Short ly after the peace of Leoben, in the Spring of 1 79 7 ,  Napoleon 
conc luded a treaty with the King o f  S ardinia. It was an offensive and 
29 
defensive treaty meant to benefit both count ries . For our, purpose 
the terms are not important . Needless to s ay ,  the rope around the neck 
o f  Engl and was gett ing t ighter. 
At this point England had to face the combined fleet s of France, 
Sp ain, and Hol land . WliEWAustria fel l ,  only Portugal remained on the 
s ide of England, and she was more troub le than she was worth . Few 
30 people gave England a chance for survival; the foundat ions o f  England 
were ready to crumb l e .  A feel ing of gloom was rap idly sp reading over 
this t iny island nat ion .  
W ith all the prob lems faced on the cont inent , she also faced many 
internal prob lems . On February 26 , 179 7 ,  the P itt government ordered 
the B ank o f  Engl and to stop specie payment s .  Specie payment s were 
cons_idered a drain on the bank that threatened to ruin it . Mahan cites 
three reasons for this drain on the bank : (a) payments to her cont inen-
t al a l lies; (b) the expense o f  the navy ; (c) the presence o f  a scarce 
, 31 o f  invas ion and people were hoarding money . 
With England near bankruptcy, the posit ion of Pitt ' s  government 
was weakened. B ack in November o f  179 6 ,  Pitt had been stoned by a mob. 
Along with this ,  Pitt was forced to drop h is love affair with E leanor 
E den . Pitt was also having financial troub les; his mother and brother 
29 b . d 1.2:_., p .  246 . 
30Bryant , �· cit . ,  p .  1 7 2 .  
3 1Mahan , �· c it . ,  p .  230. 
were drawing too much money ·on his account . A lthough unique for this 
period of history., the honorab le Pitt was a man who did not use h is 
11 
o ffic ial posit ion fo r monet ary gain. With a swo l len face and a defin ite 
32 l ack o f  energy, Pitt ' s  health was a matter o f  great concern. 
These were the prob lems that faced Eng land in the spring o f  179 7; 
one author cal led it "The B lack Year o f  179 7 . "  England ' s  only hope lay 
in her navy which was now rendered useless by a mut iny in her channel 
fleet at Sp ithead and Nore. That these mut inies did not have more 
catastrophic consequences is due to the fact that the English government 
d id make concess ions . Othervnse, England may have fallen by the wayside 
again st the power ful aI'll¥ o f  Napo leon, and this possib i l ity was c loser 
than mo st authors seem to indicate.  This wr iter serious ly doubts  i f  
England has faced prob lems :that were any more serious to  her internal 
securi ty than these mut inies o f  179 7 - pos s ib ly not again unt il  the 
o utbreak of Worl d  War .II . 
32 
Bryant , .££.• cit . ,  pp . 174- 175 . 
CHAPTER III 
CAUSES OF THE MUTINY 
As the writer �ntends to po int out , th is thes is intends to 
show that at these mutinies at Sp ithead and Nore, sedit ious i!Ctivity 
took p lace -- that is,  the United Irishmen took an active part in 
inst igat ing these two mutinies . 
The condit ion o f  the Engl ish seaman in the latter part o f  the 
eighteenth century was one o f  hardship and privat ion. It was said 
1 
that "seamen at th is t ime l ive without hope . "  There were several 
reasons for these various· condit ions that prevailed in the Engl ish navy . 
They were: low pay, poor food, recruitment , and harsh puni shment . It 
was the popular belief o f  the Admiralty that , "Jack dances and s ings 
2 and is always content . "  The Admiralty contended that the ordinary 
seaman knew nothing o f  the value o f  money and could put up with any and 
a l l  hardsh ips put before h im i f  he had p lenty o f  gro g, which was a st rong 
3 drink that was handed out to the seamen . 
One o f  the majo r grievances that the men asked for in their 
·pet itions to the Admiralty concerned the sys tem of recruitment and 
imp ressment . The system o f  impres sment , 
• •  
is cons idered by every o fficer o f  experience 
as essent ial ly necessary for the manning o f  the 
fleet , and of vital importance to the B ritish navy .4 
1George Manwaring and Bonamy Dobree, The Float ing Republ ic 
(London: Geo f frey B le s ,  1935 ) ,  p .  15 . 
2Knight , .£12.• cit . ,  p .  339 . 
3Ib id.  
4Ib i d .  
13 
In March and Apr i l  of 179 5 ,  Parl iament passed act s that called 
fo r each kingdom to contribute men to h is majesty ' s  navy . Their total 
contr ibut ion would be roughly proport ionate t o  their population. These 
men were called "quota" men and gave the conununity an opportunity to 
get rid o f  its more undes irable member s .  It was not cons idered unusual 
for a community to o f fer a bounty as high as t70 fo r any man to volunteer 
5 
for naval service. However , these act s did not stop the pract ice o f  
the various "press gangs .  116 
Most recruitment was carried out by p re s s  gangs ,  wh ich were very 
c ruel to·their cap t ives , as wel l  as being very inefficient . These gangs 
were supposed to carry out their recruitment in the coastal towns, how-
eve r ,  many inland towns were invaded by the gangs . An impressed sai lor 
I 
had hi s  remedy in the courts o f  law, but these courts worked very slowly 
and in many cases men would have just returned from a long voyage and 
then they would be p res sed back into the service, in many cases without 
receiving any back pay or being able to see their famil ie s .  
Many t imes the sailors would leave their ships before they put 
into port . To stop this pract ice, which had led to many wrecks ,  a change 
o f  crews would take p lace when a ship came up the channel .  Certain types 
o f  seamen, such as apprent ices , watermen , and so on, were g iven p rotect ion 
by the Admiralty for a payment . These men would board a ship at Fairleigh 
or at other point s ,  and then t ake the ship into port. Once these men 
arr ived on board a sh ip , many crews would then ji.nnp ship , go ashore and 
5 Ful ler, �· c it . ,  p .  85 . 
6Ib id . , pp . 83-84 . 
14 
eventually s catter over the countrys ide . In the various coastal towns 
"cr imps and publ icans" did a tremendous busines s protect ing sailors 
from the p ress gangs sent out to recapture the epcaped sailors . Many 
t imes these crimp s would t ake a sai lor ' s  money and l ater betray him to 
7 
the author it ies for a. future reward.  
Lord Hawke summed up this situation when he remarked that when a 
p ress gang put . in an appearance at his Yorkshire estate h is workmen 
8 
"scattered. l ike a covey o f  partridges . "  Needless to say ,  there were 
many reformers in England who wanted to dispose o f  this system o f  
imp res sment , however, the Admiralty seemed t o  be too conservative to 
9 
want a change in their o ld t ried .<¥.J.d. tested pract ice . This writer can 
readi ly .underst and why the mut ineers would  want this inhuman pract ice 
changed to a more realist ic system. 
The injust ice o f  this system is eas ily understood today, but we 
must not be too harsh on these eighteenth century Eng l ishmen, because 
it was an o ld system that had produced sat is factory result s in the p ast 
and it could not be changed by a mut inous fleet . 
Another maj or grievance was the punishment that was handed out by 
the princip le o fficer s .  The p r incip le punishment , by far , was the 
c ruel and horrible system o f  flogging a man . An instrument known as 
"the Cat " was used in the administer ing o f  the lashes . It was made o f  
a short p iece o f  wood which was covered by a red baize and from the end 
7 Ib id . , pp . 84-85 .  
8Ib id . , p .  84 . 
9 Ib id. , p .  86 . 
10 
of this hung "nine knotted leather cords about two feet long . "  A 
boat swain or a mate admin istered the lashes wh ich could cut a man ' s 
b ack to r ibbons after a few strokes . The unfortunate seamen were 
15 
st ripped to the waist and t ied to the grat ing .  The crew was as s embled 
and the marines were- arme_d for the occas ion. The captain, officers , 
and othe r crew members removed their hat s as the captain read the 
v io lated rul e s .  As the mat e  stepp ed forward to achninister the l ashes , 
a half minute bell would t o l l  and the drumme r  boys would beat out a ro l l  
on their drums . This was the scene as the mate administered the 
p re scribed amount of lashes, The rules stat ed that the flogger could not 
show any leniency towards the guilty seaman for this would mean an 
immed iate flogging for him, After a while the flogger was changed , 
generally aft er t wo dozen lashes , or at any t ime he showed any s igns of 
t ir ing. 
The throngs of the cat were cleaned by running the hands through 
them to clean out the blood and torn flesh . Both right and left handed 
floggers were used so as to cross the strokes ,  Th is was done , no doubt , 
to do a b etter job in tearing up the seaman's back, Mos t  of the 
e ighteenth century seamen could boas t that they could t ake a dozen lashes 
without moving a:·1muscle,  although this number cut the b ack to  r ibbons 
so that it resemb led raw meat , Three dozen lashes were conside red serious , 
b ut six do zen lashes were not infrequently given out , and for a serious 
offense,  such as striking a superior officer, a man was flogged around 
10 Ib id. , pp . 88-89 . 
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the fleet . For this punishment , the v ictim was tied in a small  boat 
and rowed to every ship pres ent in port to receive a s t ipulated number 
of lashes . In most cases.a man died from this punishment ,  however, some 
o f  the more brut al captains insisted that a man cont inue to be flogged 
11 
around the fleet even after he had died. 
Other punishment s were to "smart a man . "  During this process 
a man 'was beat en about the face, head ,  and neck with a knotted rop e .  
This be at ing was administered by a . boat s wain ' s  mate on an order from an 
o ff icer. ·This was an extremely painful punishment , but was not usually 
12 
fat al .  
Imp ert inence was punishab le by gagging the seaman with an iron 
mar l ine-sp ike . This punishment could be ordered by a subordinate 
o fficer and was free ly exercised , The spike was kept in the mouth unt i l  
large quant it ies o f  b lood had been drawn. This punishment , obviously, 
was very pain ful and humil iat ing to the men o f  the lower decks o f  his 
• I h • 13 ma3 esty s s ips .  
Needless to s ay,  conditions were app al ling on the sh ip s o f  King 
George ; however ,  we must not criticize these pract ices in the fleet too 
harshly. ·By our standards they were brut al , however, we must not judge 
these  p-ract ices by our l ate r  day st andards . We must not judge lest we 
be judged.  
Low p ay was another source o f  grievance to the men of  the channel 
fleet . The Merchant Marine pay had increased, sometimes as high as f4 
11Ib id. 
12rb id . ,  pp . 9 0-91. 
13 Ib id. 
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or � S a month. An English seaman was, also, expected to contribute to 
the Chatham Chest pens ion in which a seaman would receive .f7 a year when 
he retired, which a seaman might or might not receive. The seamen were 
also forced to buy their own clothing, bedding, and other necessities 
from, in many cases, dishonest pursers, who charged exorbitant prices. 
Any.disability on the part of a seaman would stop his pay and a man 
was generally paid every two years, but there had been cases of men not 
being paid for ten to twelve years. A man was never paid in full until 
a ship's connnission ended. In most cases a seaman received a ticket 
with the amount due on it, and many times he would cash it in at a port 
to a broker who would charge a high discount rate. Thus, many wives and 
14 children lived in poverty on charity from the church and its members. 
Naval pay was fixed during the reign of Charles II (1660 - 1685). 
Pay was twenty-two s. and six D .  a month which was twenty-eight days. 
Able seamen got nineteen S . ;  ordinary seamen eighteen S ,  and it has 
been established that the cost of living had increased some thirty.per 
15 cent. The various offers made by the Admiralty to the men are treated 
in the next chapter. 
Food served on his Majesty's ships consisted of biscuits, salt 
beef, salt pork, pease, oatmeal, sugar, butter, and cheese. Most of the 
time the food served the men was not fit for human consumption. On . 
Monday, Wednesday and Friday meat was not served to the men. 
14Ibid., pp. 86-87. 
lSHunt, £E.. cit. , p. 39 . 
The men be ing compensat e d  for t wo poWldS of 
s alt b eef per head or one pound of salt pork per 
head by two ounces each of sugar, butter,  and 
chee s e ,  not issued on meat days;  half a p int of 
pease per head was issued on four days a week, but 
the only co11Uitodity issued daily was one pound of 
biscuit to each man.16 
The seamen were grouped in "mes ses" of six and the s e  six men 
18 
received the allotment of four men calculated at fourteen ounces to the 
pound. The men,were  also to receive a monetary comp ensat ion, but it is 
17 
doubtful that they rece ived it . 
"Grog" was the one de l ight the sailors had. Each man r ece ived 
his share at midday and in the even ing . Grog was a very pot ent drink 
and men could not t ake it str.aight so it was deluted with three gills 
of water  with lemon acid added and s erved to the men . When the drink 
was served it was warm enough to warm the stomach of the mo st expe rienced 
seamen and to the inexperienced.seaman it forced him to wobble  to bed . 
Th is potent dr ink caused many a man ' s  tongue to become indiscreet and in 
the morning he was up for punishment , vmich, as the author has pointed 
18 out , was unbe lievab ly severe . 
Thus , pay ,  food,  punishment , and recruitment were the main 
grievances of the mut inous seamen. However,  it is  the cont ent ion of 
this writer to. po int out that the Unit ed Irishmen inst igated thes e  
mut inies and p layed a more important role than most authors  o n  the sub j ect 
t end  to imp ly. 
16 Fuller,  .££_. cit . , _ p. 8 7 .  
1 7 Ib id. 
18Ib id. 
Manwaring and Dobree , in The Float ing Repub l i c ,  s ay :  
Nevertheles s ,  P itt and the Govermnent , with a 
touching fidelity to the idea o f  foreign influence, 
made every e f fort to discover Jacobin prop aganda at 
the bottom o f  the murkey bus ine s s .  The ir att empt s to 
discover it at Port smouth proved fut ile , but they 
hop ed for better luck at Sheernes s  and sent down the 
trusty Graham, accompanied by Williams , to conduct a 
s earching inquiry at that p lace .  The story they told, 
as magist rat e s  used to the dis ent�gling o f  evidence , 
should carry enough weight to dispose o f  the idea 
that subversive doctrines insp ired the behavior of the 
men at the Nore . 19 
They cont inued t o  say that: 
. it may be pointed out that the mut ineers at Nore 
at one t ime had London at their mercy . They were in 
possess ion o f  thirty of the King's sh ip s ,  and had 
e ffectively stopped the nav igation o f  the river Thames 
and Medway, and might have starved the cap ital , at a l l  
times. i l l  stored an d  supp lied with food an d  fue l ;  
yet they had done no more than rifle a few ship s to 
fill their own stomachs. Had their policy been born o f  
revolut ionary ideas , they would cert ainly not have l et·:: 
them s l ip such a decisive opportunity . 20 
19 
However, these authors are not comp letely obj ect ive on th is po int , 
and the fo llowing indicates that the mut ineers did "e ffec t ively stop 
navigat ion of the Thame s . "  
T o  the Committ e e ,  
(this letter was sent to the committee on each ship 
,present at the Nore . )  
· 
Hereby you are des ired by the Delegates  o f  the 
Whol e F leet to det ain all vessels to and from the 
Port of London, those excep ted who se cargoes  are 
peri shab l e ,  t aking an account o f  the name-of each 
ship s .  
G iven under our hand this 2nd day o f  June 1 7 9 7  
on board H .  M .  s. S andwich . 21 
19Manwar ing and Dobre e ,  .2.E.• c it . , p .  249 . 
20rb id . , p.  2s1 . 
21rb id ... ; p .  186. 
�anwaring and Dobree also point out that the blockade was meant as a 
challenge only to indicate what the seamen might do: 
• in order to show the country they had it in 
their power to stop trade on the river;22ut had no intention of injuring their country. 
This obviously indicates that the mutineers did hot want to 
20 
effectively stop navigation of the Thames· and Medway rivers and that food 
stores continued to be displaced at their London destination. 
It is also a fact that several United Irishmen were in the English 
navy; that they had sympathizers in the fleet; and that some had 
connections with various Corresponding Societies of the United Irishmen. 
The writer must also point out that handbills and pamphlets had been 
smuggled on board the fleet at Spithead. Some authorities in the field 
indicate that the English navy contained as many as ten per cent 
foreigners and ten per cent Irish, with an ever increasing amount of 
23 
United Irishmen and French. 
The creditability of this thesis is also augmented by the fact 
that one of the delegates and leaders of the mutiny at Spithead was 
Valentine Joyce - a United Irishman. Joyce was one of th� signers of a 
docmnent signed March 26, 1778, which has been called the "Magna Charta 
of the Irish Volunteers." This docmnent Wl'!S styled after the Belfast 
First Volunteer company.
24 This indicates to this writer that the United 
Irishmen must have had some previous plan concerning mutiny, or they would 
22Ibid. 
23 Arthur Bryant, The Years of Endurance (New York: Harper and 
Brothers Publishers, 1942),-PP:-190-191. 
24Richard Madden, The United Irishmen, Lives and Times (London: 
The Catholic Publishing and Bookselling Company, 1860),---ir:-p. 29. 
21 
not have gotten Joyce, a leading United Irishman, as one of the leaders 
of the mutiny. It must also be noted that many of the delegates at 
Spithead were of Irish origin, which seems to lend more plausibility 
to this thesis. 
There are also further indications that the United Irishmen planned 
this mutiny previous to its outbreak. This appears in a letter sent 
to Lord Spencer, the Chief of the Admiralty, from Sir Edward Nevenham, 
a prominent Irish politician, dated April 28, 1797. The following is 
a partial quotation from that letter: 
That during my illness two friends of mine from 
the neighborhood of Belfast came to me - and gave the 
following information: 
That both on the late and former trials they 
conversed with several of the United rebels, who were 
sentenced to be put on board ship, and that their 
common declarations were that they would be of more 
service to the cause on board a man-of-war than they 
could be at present on land for they would immediately 
form clubs, and swear.:every man to be !:.rue to each 
other, • • •  I submit to your lordship that no more of 
these rebels should be sent on board the fleet, for one 
of them would poison seven-hundred men, All that went 
t ook with them members of that rebellious paper, the 
NORTHERN STAR, and were sworned to that purpose of 
poisoning the minds of the sailors.25 
This same attitude is taken by Captain Payne of the Impetueux, who 
was a member of Lord Bridgeport 1 s squadron, which had been cruising near 
Brest, France, In a letter and an enclosure to Spencer, Payne noted that: 
The character of the pres�nt mutiny is perfectly 
French, • •  and the naval difficulties will never be 
25Julian S, Corbett (Ed,), Private Papers of George, Second Earl 
of Spencer (London: Publications of the Navy Records Society, MDCCCXIV), 
II, pp, 119-120. 
thoroughly adjusted until the secret Jacobin springs 
that now direct it are fairly disclosed and removed. 26 
22 
Richard Parker, the leader of the Nore mutiny, notes he was also 
received into a society that he does not name.27 It is the opinion of 
this writer that this nameless society was one of United Irish origin 
and ideas. 
Two important men ·of that period agree with the view that the 
United Irishmen were causing the mutinies. None other than the noted 
Edmund Burke said: "Ireland was the trouble spot and Joy.ce was a seditious 
28" . 
Belfast Clubist." Burke was certainly right about Joyce, and as the 
writer has pointed out, Joyce was one of the signers of the Magna Charta 
of the Irish Volunteers a United Irish organization. -
Thomas G;r:env'.illealso concurred that the Jacobins, acting through 
the United Irishmen, were behind the mutinies. Greville said: 
I cannot help fearing the evil is • • •  deeply 
rooted in the influence of Jacobin emmissaries and 
the Corresponding Society. I am more and more con­
vinced that Jacobin mana�gnent and influence is at 
the bottom of this evil. · 
It is also noted ih a report from The Secret Committee of the House 
of Commons of Ireland, that in the court martial of ''William Guthry, 
James Calloway, Thomas Afhly, and Robert Johnfon," held on board the 
Royal William at Spithead, June 29-23, 1797, that: 
A piece of papet (sic) that had been found among 
Prifoner Johnfon's Things, when they were examined 
in the Captain's cabin • • • •  (The information on the 
p;aper is as follows) 
26corbett, 2.E· cit., pp. 111-114. 
27Ibid., p. 170. 
28Manwa.ring and Dobree, 2.E• cit., p. 101. 
29�. 
I ------------ to ever ftand true till Death in 
promoting the Caufe of Freedom with Equity, while 3o 
any probability of futhering its progrefs remains. 
It should also be noted that the above men were found guilty of 
conducting a mutiny in His Majesty's ships and sentenced for their 
31 
crimes. 
It is the contention of this writer to say that the letter found 
on "Johnfon" is definitely the ideas of the United Irishmen, which 
23 
corresponds to the clause Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity of the French 
Revolution. It is highly possible that other such material was present 
in copious amounts and that it had been distributed to the sailors by 
the United Irishmen. 
It is the opinion of this writer then to contend that the position 
of the United Irishmen has been pushed into the background by authors 
in these mutinies and that the United Irishmen played a much larger 
part than is generally accredited to them. This writer believes he had 
firmly demonstrated this possibility and the creditability of such a 
thesis. 
30Printed by Authority, The Report from the Secret Co=ittee' of the 
House of Counnons of Ireland (Dublin: James King and A. B .  King, 1798)
-
,
­
PP• 87-88. 
CHAPTER IV 
HISTORY OF THE MUTINIES 
In this chapter the writer will deal only with the most important 
events of the two mutinies. Obviously, it would be impossible to give 
a minute by minute account of these two mutinies. For the purpose of 
better chronology, the writer has divided this chapter into two 
sections. Section I deals with the Spithead mutiny and Section II deals 
with the mutiny at the Nore. 
25 
Spithead 
During the wintet of 1796, the English channel fleet had sent 
several petitions to the Lords of the Admiralty, but they were quashed 
without Lord Spencer, the Chief of the Admiralty, seeing them. In fact, 
Spencer was "kepted in a state of repressive ignorance, 11
1 
The most 
logical answer for this seems to be one of politics. The condition of 
the government did not warrant another crisis at this time. In fact, 
it is doubtful just how much more the Pitt government could stand without 
falling. 
When the channel fleet returned in March, their petitions had not 
been acted upon and the men were greeted with nothing but silence from 
the Pitt government. Of course, this made the men angry and they took 
steps to remedy this situation.2 
After receiving no reply to their petitions the men continued to 
plot and many petitions were then sent from one ship to another, The 
following is a letter sent to the Queen Charlotte by the London on 
February 26, 1797. 
Messmates, 
I duly received your letter yesterday (February 
25, 1797), and have shewn it to several and all agree 
in returning your hearty thanks for your kind inten­
tions. The resolution is generous, the intention 
noble. In' short it is worthy of the Glorious First of 
June, 
1Manwaring and Dobree, �· cit,, pp. 10-12. 
2Bryant, �· cit., pp. 20-21. 
I beg leave, however, to mention one thing which 
you have forgot. You intreat his lordship to inter­
cede the board of.Ach:niralty for augmentation of pay. 
But that is not under their jurisdiction to do; it is 
a national affair, and must be addressed to the hon. 
House of Commons. It is from them alone that we can 
expect redress. They are the purse bearers of the 
nation. Let them be petitioned and I make no doubt 
but their generosity. One thing more you might have 
added, there has been no alteration in the pay of the 
navy since the reign of King Charles the second when 
at this time every thing was reasonable that even 
double the money now is hardly equivalent to purchase 
any of the necessarieis of life. You will, if you 
please, reflect on these reasons, and if you approve, 
not otherwise, please adopt them. 
Yours most affectionately, 
"London113 
From the writing of this letter one can see that the letter was 
26 
well written and scholarly. Perhaps too well written for the eighteenth 
century English seaman. It is also interesting to note that the men 
knew that it had been well over one hundred years since there had been.'. 
a pay raise in the navy • .  This writer seriously doubts that ordinary 
seamen would have this information at hand; however, this would be good 
material for the United Irislunen to use to instigate the men into mutiny. 
After this new plotting, other petitions were sent to Lord Howe, 
at Bath. Howe, a naval hero to these men, received eleven such petitions. 
These petitions were very respectful to the ageing Howe and dealt with 
the conditions that the men wanted improved.4 
These petitions, sent from Portsmouth, appear to be written by one 
person and were attributed to the evil ''Machanations" of some enemy of 
\ianwaring and Dobree, .2£• cit., pp. 20-21. 
4Puller, .2£• cit., p. 94. 
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the government, It must be noted that one of the foremost enemies of 
England, at this time, were the United Irishmen, This writer can 
reasonably ass1.lllle that they were responsible for these petitions, 
Other petitions were sent to Charles James Fox, the leader of 
the opposition party in the government, and Evan Nepean, a secretary 
6 to the Admiralty. These were precautionary measures taken to inform 
the opposition of the conditions prevailing in the navy. 
Since this move indicates a certain amount of pre-planning, which 
the ordinary eighteenth century English seaman probably could not do, 
it is the opinion of this writer that the United Irishmen were 
responsible, 
Lord Howe received the petitions, no doubt, with a great deal of 
7 
distaste, After reading the petitions, Howe wrote to Lord Hugh Seymour, 
a Lord in the Admiralty, and asked him to inquire around at Portsmouth 
and report back any discontent among the seamen; Seymour did this and 
notified Howe that everything seemed normal.8 
Howe went to London on the twenty-second of March and gave Seymour 
the Petitions, who then passed them on to Lord Spencer, who was 
9 . 
completely aghast at this incident; he had not been previously warned 
of the existing situation, 
5Knight, �· cit., p. 338. 
6Manwaring and Dobree, �· cit, , p. 28. 
7Fuller, �· cit., p, 93, 
8t.ianwaring and Dobree, �· cit., p. 24. 
9Ibid. 
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By the end of March the men had received no answer to their 
10 
petitions and they felt, and rightly so, that Howe had forsaken them, 
From this point on the:mutiny began to speed up and grow in strength. 
Strictly by chance, on April 12, Captain Patton, of the t'ransporta-
tion office, heard of the �utineer's plans. He immediately warned Sir 
Peter Parker, the Port Admiral, of this startling news and they quickly 
informed Admiral Bridport of the existing situation. Bridport, the. 
commander of the Fleet, promptly sent a note to Spencer telling of the 
new development. The following is the note Bridport sent to Spencer: 
My Lord, 
Royal George, 
Spithead, 
13th April, 1797. 
I am sorry to inform your Lordship that a 
circumstance reached me yesterday which gave me much 
concern. It has been stated to me that representations 
have been made by the crews of the Channel Fleet to 
Lord Howe and the Admiralty for an increase in pay, If 
this should be the case it would be very desirable for 
me to know what steps have been taken in consequence 
thereof, I am particularly anxious to receive such 
instructions as your Lordship and the Board may think 
expedient with as little delay as possible as I 
yesterday heard that some disagreeable combinations 
were forming among the ships at Spithead on this subject. 
Captain Glynn will deliver this with the utmost 
expedition to your Ii.ordship. He is not acquainted with 
contents, 
P. S, -- it is reported to ml1that this subject proceed from the Queen Charlotte, 
Bridport was probably calmed by the fact that most trouble was 
coming from the Queen Charlotte, the flagship of Lord Howe, who was still 
technically in connnand,12 
lOibid. , p. 26. 
llibid.. , p. 29. 
12Fuller, £2.• E.!!·• p. 94, 
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When Bridport received Spencer's return connnunication, he was 
thunderstruck that he had not been forewarned as to what had been going 
on. Several thoughts must have been running through his mind as to what 
to think about the Admiralty. No doubt, and this writer agrees, that 
he considered the Admiralty in an unfavorable light. This writer has 
already considered in a previous chapter the seriousness of the English 
position at this time. Bridport had every right to consider the Admiralty 
as fools; calamity could strike at any moment and Bridport had not even 
been warned of an impending mutiny in the channel fleet. Mistakes like 
this could have proven very costly. 
Admiral Bridport was then ordered to sail with the first favorable 
wind. When the wind shifted in the right direction, on April 16, Easter 
Sunday, Bridport ordered Admiral Gardner to Saint Helens. All eyes 
turned toward the Royal Sovereign, the flagship of Gardner's squadron, 
but not a man obeyed orders. Suddenly from the Queen Charlotte came 
three cheers -- the mutiny had begun. Excitement gripped the whole fleet 
as the crews were assembled and told to state their grievances. After 
doing this, Bridport sent Rear-Admiral Sir Charles M. Pole on to London 
13 
with news of the mutiny and with a list of the various grievances. 
In the evening, thirty two delegates, two from the sixteen men-of-
war stationed at Spithead, met in the state-room of the Queen Charlotte 
and drew up a set of rules and regulations for the fleet. The following 
are six rules that resulted from this meeting: (1) watches were to be 
k,ept; ( 2) drunkenness was punish ab le by flogging and ducking, and ropes 
13t.ianwaring and Dobree, .2.E.· cit. , p. 32. 
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\�ere placed on the fore-yards to show the men that the delegates meant 
"mat they said; (3) women \•Jere allowed to come aboard but not to go 
back to land until the matter was settled, no doubt this was a pleasant 
convenience for the men; (4) respect was to be paid to the officers; 
(5) not an anchor was to be raised; (6) and "to symbolize their unanim;i:ty 
the shrouds were to be mann�d in the morning and evening and three cheers 
14 
given. " The leader of this mutiny was Valentine Joyce, a twenty-six 
15 year .old quartermasters mate. However, the definitive work on the 
subject, The Floating Republic, by Manwaring and Dobree, indicates that 
there is a lack of sufficient proof to say that Joyce was the acknowledged 
leader and it also points out that some of the delegates, which are 
16 
listed in the appendix, did not betray their Irish origin. This lends 
more plausibility to this thesis--that the mutinies were the work of the 
United Ir:i.shmen. When one looks at the secrecy of the mutiny, the well 
written letters and petitions, the remarkable order in which the mutiny 
got started, sailors and delegates of known Irish origin, the over-all 
smoothness of the operation, and the over-all evidence of pre-planning, 
it appears to this writer that the average eighteenth century English 
seaman could not conceive and carry out such a feat as this mutiny and 
the succeeding one at Nore. 
On April 17, an oath �vas administered to every man in the fleet 
17 "to uphold the common cause in which they were engaged." This was 
14Bryant, EE• cit. , p. 187. 
15 Fuller, op. cit., p. 95. 
16Manwaring and Dobree, EE• cit. , p. 34. 
17Knight, £12.• cit. , p. 339. 
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obviously a precautionary measure to test the strength of the delegates 
and the feeling of the men. 
The next step was with. the Admiralty and it was soon to be forth 
coming. Admiral Pole had been dispatched with news of the mutiny when 
it was evident that the fleet would not sail. Pole reached the Admiralty 
near midnight of the sixteenth and in the early hours of the morning of 
Tuesday told Lord Spencer of the news from Spithead. When the first 
rays of daylight appeared the two men went to see William Pitt, the Prime 
. . . f h f h . 18 Minister, to noti y t e government o t e mutiny. In the evening, Pitt 
dispatched Spencer, Lord Arden, Rear-Admiral Young, and secretary Marsden 
to Portsmouth and the mutinous fleet. The Admiralty board arrived at 
19 noon on the eighteenth and set up their headquarters at the Fountain Inn. 
On the eighteenth the board formally met. Admiral Gardner, Admiral 
Colpoys, and Admiral Pole were used as go betweens with the delegates, 
thus the honorable board would not lose any of its dignity. The board 
decided to offer the men: (a) four shillings a month for able seamen; 
(b) three shillings for ordinary seamen; (c) two shillings for landsmen. 
The board requested that the qelegates answer by ten o'clock on the 
nineteenth; however, no answer was received by the board until four 
thirty in the afternoon. Obviously the board was furious and some 
officers wanted to take more drastic action; however, cooler heads pre-
. 20 vailed. 
18 Bryant, EE.· cit. , pp. 187-188. 
19Manwaring and Dobree, .£E.• cit., p. 42. 
20 Fuller, �cit. , p. 97. 
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When the delegates turned down the Board's first offer they 
requested that: (a) fresh vegetables should be properly cared for; (b) 
that pay should be paid in port; (c) that the sick should be properly 
cared for (many doctors were drunkards); (d) that pay should be continued 
to the wounded until they were discharged; (c) and when in harbor, men 
should have leave to go ashore instead of being forced to remain aboard 
like prisoners. To this writer these requests were reasonable and in 
the end they were granted with no injury to the country.21 
At this time the Admiralty Board considered the fleet: 
• • •  Really sound, but just for the moment suffering 
from the presence of a few agitators; the rest were 
poor simple men misguided by rogues scheming for some 
ulterior purpose.22 
Who were these "agitators" that the Admiralty board said were 
present? It is the opinion of this author that since we know that men of 
Irish origin were in the English navy and that many of the delegates were 
Irish, it is thus reasonable to assume they were United Irishmen. Besides 
the patriotic seamen, the United Irishmen would gain the most by a mutiny 
that would deem the channel fleet impotent. 
After the board 's first offer was rejected, a new offer was 
presented to the delegates: (a) able seamen were offered twenty-nine 
shillings and six pence a month; after deduction a seaman would get a 
shilling a day; (b) other seamen were to get paid in proportion to the 
able seamen; (c) a pound to be sixteen ounces; (d) acceptance of this 
21Bryant, .2.E. • cit., p. 188. 
22Manwaring and Dobree, .2.E.• cit., pp. 45-46 . 
offer would mean a general pardon would be granted. However, the men · 
23 
wanted a King's pardon and not an Admiralty pardon. 
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While Admiral Gardner was delivering this new offer, on April 21, 
he lost his temper on the Queen Charlotte and called the assembled 
delegates a "damned mutinous blackguard set of sulking fellows. " While 
still on board, the angry Gardner threatened to hang them all, obviously 
a threat he could not carry out, and this threat did not help kill any 
suspicions the delegates might have. Needless to say, Gardner was 
hustled off the Queen Charlotte and the delegates hoisted the red flag; 
on this signal the other ships followed .suit. Following this incident man 
24 
officers were either confined to their quarters or sent ashore. 
After. the Gardner episode, the delegates issued the following 
notice to the mutinous fleet: 
A Caution From the Delegates to the Fleet. 
·The settlement of a business of such vast importance 
as the present is the most critical and ought to be 
attended to with the greatest wisdom, as ourselves and 
characters depends on our present conduct, therefore the 
following considerations are absolutely necessary as a 
security and bulwark against the fair speeches of 
designing men, who will use all their eloquence to defeat 
our laudable intentions. 
First.--Indispensably requisite that the prayers of our 
petition be fully answered. 
Second. --That no verbal answer be attended to on our 
part. 
Third. --That an Act of Parliament be passed for the 
augmentation of our pay and other articles in our 
petition. 
Fourth. - -That after the petition is full satisfied, a 
petition be presented to His Majesty, and the pardon for 
the liberty we have now taken be received in due form, 
through the whole fleet ,25 
23Fuller • £2.· cit., p • 97. 
24Bryant, £E.· cit. , p. 189. 
25Fuller • £2.· cit. , p • 98. 
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Faced with this new crisis, Spencer acted with all haste. In the 
evening, Spencer left for London to obtain a royal pardon, which George 
III signed on April 22. After this, Spencer had several copies printed 
for circulation among the mutinous fleet . However, the surprised 
delegates still insisted on a "redress of grievances," but apologized 
to Lord Bridport and asked him to resume command of his fleet. The King 's 
proclamation was read to. the flee� on April 24, 1797, and Bridport 
promised satisfaction to the demands of the delegates. After - this, the 
fleet sailed to Saint Helens on the twenty-fifth--the mutiny seemed to 
b d f h . b . 26 e at an en or t e time . ei�g;. 
Needless to say, England was relieved that the mutiny was apparently 
ended, but suspicion and unrest still existed among the members of the 
fleet. Once more ferment started to grow among the fleet as letters began 
to circulate among the crews. Typical of these is the following letter 
from the Queen Charlotte: 
This is the sole agreement of the fleet, that our 
matters is not fulfilled. We are still to a man on 
our lawful cause as formal. We have come to an under­
standing of parliament, finding there is no likelihood 
of redress to our former grievance. Therefore we think 
it prudent to obtain the same liberty as before. So 
until our matters are comply'd with we are determined 
not to go to sea. 
P .  s .  -- There is Marlborough and Nymphe in a 
wretched condition. If Admiral Bridport does not 
�amply with these measures and forward them, we will 
take the speediest methods,27 
On April 30: 
A watchmaker on the Mars had gossiped with the 
surgeon's mate • • •  and told him that the men thought 
the admiralty was trifling with them. • • and the 28 sailors meant to take the fleet into Brest. • • • 
26Bryant, 2E. · cit., pp. 189-190. 
27 Fuller, .£1?.· cit., p. loo. 
28iianwaring and Dobree, .9.E• cit., p. 76. 
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Why would the fleet want to sail into Brest, unless the United 
Irishmen had encouraged them or convinced the seamen that this was the 
correct thing to do? It seems to this writer that a patriotic English 
seaman would not surrender the channel fleet to the enemy, unless he 
was convinced that this was necessary and proper. The quest ion remains : 
how would sailing the fleet into Brest benefit the English seamen? 
However, it would benefit the United Irishmen and indeed help their cause. 
Suspicion of the government continued to mount as new threats of 
parliamentary chicanery occurred , On the third of May, the Duke of 
Bedford wanted to convey to the mutinous fleet the erroneous idea that 
the government intended .to drop the bill for supplementary naval pay and 
at the same time the Admiralty circulated a doclllllei:lt "forbidding captains 
to temporise with mutiny and directing the marines to be kept in a 
constant readiness action. 1129 This was an obvious attempt by the Admiralty 
to save face. However> much to the consternation of the Admiralty, the 
contents of this doclllllent became known to the fleet and on Sunday, May 7 ,  
the fleet once more refused .to obey Bridport 's colilliland to put to sea. At 
once the seamen manned the shrouds and cheers once more echoed through 
the fleet--the mutiny had begun again.30 This must have been a crushing 
b'low to Bridport, who certainly was a victim of circumstances all through 
the mutiny at Spithead. 
This second outbreak took on the aspects of something more serious 
'than the first mutiny back in April. The men of the Royal George seized 
29Bryant, ££.• cit., p. 191. 
30ibid. 
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arms and annnunition and swore that their officers had deceived them. 
This was followed by a brawl on Admiral Colpoy '  s flagship, which almost 
ended in the hanging of the Admiral and an officer who had shot a seaman 
during the fight . After this unruly incident, severai of the crews put 
their more unpopular officers ashore. Obviously the people of ?ortsmouth 
were aghast; they expected to see the arrival of the French revolutionists 
and their bloody guillotines and at the same time the Civil Lord of the 
Admiralty wrote to Spencer sayin3 that this was "the most awful crisis" 
that England had known in a long time. 31 
The next objective of the delegates was to concentrate all their 
sh:iips at Saint Helens, which was only three miles from Spithead. Several 
of the mutinous delegates had gotten the idea chat the Admiralty wanted 
to split up the fleet. 32 This indicates to this writer that someone knew 
what to do to keep the mutiny going and when to do it. Someone with 
intelligence and foresight evidently planned this movement and it would 
have been very easy for the United Irishmen to do this very thing. 
Parliamentary authorities, with a great deal of haste, passed the 
supplementary wage increase and Howe immediately left for Portsmouth to 
deliver the King ' s  pardon and the redress of grievance on behalf of the 
Admiralty. Lord Howe visited every ship to deliver this message and to 
restore confidence in the men that they would be properly treated. By 
May 13, Howe was satisfied that he had quieted "the mo st suspicious but 
most generous minds. " 
31Ibid. 
3�anwaring and Dobree, .2E.• cit. , pp. 8 7 -88. 
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By May 17, 1797, the channel fleet put to sea to seek the enemies 
of  England--the revolutionaries of France.33 Thus the mutiny at Spithead 
was at an end, but all was not well at Nore, where a more violent 
mutiny had broken out that again threatened to bring England to her knees. 
33 
Bryant, �· cit., pp. 191-192. 
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The Mutiny at Nore 
The mutiny at Sheerness broke out May 12,  179 7 .  On that day the 
men refused to obey their officers and turned the guns toward the fore-
castle on the quarterdecks and shortly thereafter the whole fleet was in 
1 
mutiny at the Great and Little Nore. 
Richard Parker was the leader of this second mutiny. Parker was 
an ex-schoolmaster who had taken money from the government quota to get 
himself freed from debtors prison. Parker had been to sea three times 
when the mutiny broke out and seems to have been a capable seaman, but 
2 
he had been dem0;ted in rank from a midshipman because of insubordination. 
This mutiny at Nore was a great deal harder to organize than the 
preceeding one at Spithead. The biggest problem the organizers had to 
face was the fact that the ships at Nore were not a part of a united 
fleet but single ships that were docked at Nore. 3 This lends more 
plausibility to the thesis that the mutiny was organized by United Irish-
men -- the ships at Nore "contained a large number of London roughs and 
some disaffected Irishmen. 1 14 Thus it would have been very easy for the 
United Irishmen to persuade these "London rogues" to mutiny. 
During the first days of the mutiny, the mutineers paraded in the 
streets of Sheerness or rowed around the port. In either case they were 
armed with pistols and other weapons; obviously they were not a welcome 
1Ibid., p, 19 3 .  
2Ibid., pp. 19 3-194, 
\ranwaring and Dobree, .212.• cit., p, 125, 
4trunt, .212.· cit., p. 39 3, 
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sight to the citizens of Sheerness. Wherever the mutinous men went they 
were accompanied by a brass band playing "Rule Britannia" and ' 'Britons 
Strike Home. 11 This aggressive activity caused the Pitt goverrunent to 
send two regiments into Sheerness to preserve law and order. Parker 
protested this move to Admiral Buckner claiming it was an "insult to 
the peaceable behavior of the seamen." Parker also criticized the 
Admiralty for not coming to Sheerness to give the mutineers satisfaction 
5 
to their demands. 
Following this, on May 20, the mutineers requested Admiral Buckner 
of the Sandwich to forward their demands to the Pitt government: 
Article lst.--That every indulgence granted to 
the fleet at Portsmouth be granted to his majesty's 
subjects serving the fleet at the Nore, and on places 
adjacent. 
· 
Article 2nd.--That every man, upon a ship's 
coming into harbour shall have liberty (a certain 
number at a time so as not to injure the ship's duty) 
to go and see their friends and families; a convenient 
time to be al lowed to each man. 
Article 3rd.--That all ships before they go to 
sea, shall be paid all arrears of wages down to six 
months, according to the old rules. 
Article 4th.--That no officer that has been 
turned out of any of his Majesty ' s  ships shall be 
employed in the same ship again, without the consent 
of the ship's company. 
Article Sth.--That when any of his Majesty ' s  ships 
shalLb.e paid that may have been some time in commission, 
if there are any pressed men on board that may not be 
in the regular course of payment, they shall receive 
two months advance to furnish them with necessaries. 
Article 6th.--That an indemnification be made 
any men who run, and may now be in his Majesty's naval 
service, and that they shall not be liable to be taken 
up as deserters. 
Article 7th.--That a more equal distribution be 
· made of prize money to the crews of his Majesty's ships 
and vessels of war. 
5Bryant, .2E.• cit., p. 194. 
Article 8th . --That the articles of war, as now 
enforced, require various alteration, several of 
which to be expunged therefrom, and if more moderate 
ones were held forth to seamen in general, it •rould 
be the means of taking off that terror and prejudice 
against his Majesty 's  service, on that account too 
frequently imbibed by seamen, from entering voluntar­
ily into the service .6 
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The. Pitt government was shocked by this request from the mutinous 
sailors at Nore and told Buckner, the commanding officer at Nore, to 
refuse any of these outrageous demands, and when the seamen at Nore heard 
of this they hoisted the red flag--a symbol of defiance. 7 
By May 23,  the mutinous seamen had seized eight gunboats lying at 
Sheerness and took them to Nore . On May 24 , they sent delegates to 
Yarmouth to try and persuade Admiral Duncan 's  fleet to mutiny. At this 
time Duncan had just received word that the Dutch fleet was about to 
sail for Ireland with troops for an invasion.8 This indicates to this 
writer that there was an over-all general plan, and that the group of men 
the French could depend on being loyal to their cause against England 
were the United Irishmen. Obviously the French could not count on 
Englishmen to instigate a mutiny that would render the channel fleet 
impotent; therefore, the only other source Yrould be:· the United Irishmen 
in the English navy . 
Duncan's fleet did mutiny on May 23 . "Never before had a British 
9 fleet turned for home in the face of the enemy. " When Duncan found 
6Manwaring and Dobree, .££• cit. , pp. 141- 143 . 
7Ibid. , pp. 144-146 . 
8 Bryant, .£E.• cit., p. 194. 
gM ' d b ' 178 anwaring an Do ree, 2£• cit. , p. • 
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himself deserted by most of his fleet, he made the following statement: 
My Lads, 
I once more call you together with a sorrowful 
heart, from which I have lately seen the disaffection 
of .the fleets , I call it disaffection for the crews 
had no grievances. To be deserted by my fleet in the 
face of an enemy, is a disgrace which, I believe, 
�ever before happened to a Btitish admiral; nor could 
I have supposed it possible. My greatest comfort 
under God is that I have been supported by the officers, 
seamen, and marines of this ship for which, with a heart 
over flowing with gratitude, I request you to accept 
my sincere thanks. I flatter myself much good may 
result from your example, by bringing those deluded 
people to a sense of their duty, Which·.th-ey:;_owe·�-., not 
only to their king and country, but to theirselves . 
The British navy has ever been the support of that 
liberty which has been handed down to us by our ances­
tors, and which I trust we shall maintain to the latest 
posterity; and that can only be done by unanimity and 
obedience. The ship's company, and others, who have 
distinguished themselves by their loyalty and good 
order, deserves to be, and doubtless will be the 
favorite of a grateful country. They will also have, 
from their inward feelings, a comfort "nich will be 
lasting and not like the floating and false confidence 
of those who swerved from their duty. 
It has often been my pride, with you to look into 
the Texel, and see a foe which dreaded coming out to 
meet me; my pride is now humbled indeed ! Our cup has 
overflowed and made us this check, as a warning, and 
I hope we shall improve by it. 
On him then let us trust, where our only security 
be found . I find there are many good men among us; 
for my own part, I have had full confidence of all in 
this ship; and once more beg to express my approbation 
of your conduct. 
May God, who has thus far conducted you, continue 
to do so; and may the British navy, the glory and 
support of our country, be restored to its wanted 
splendour, and be not only the bulwark of Britian, but 
the terror of the world. 
But this can only be effect by a strict adherence 
to our duty and obedience; and let us pray that the 
almighty God may keep us in the right way of thinking . 
God bless you all.10 
10s . E .  Winbolt, ;\m«�rican Independence and the French Revolution 
(London: G. Bell and Sons, 1915), pp. 99-100. 
Who had "deluded" Duncan's fleet in the face of the enemy? It 
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is the opinion of this writer that some outside influence must have been 
present to bring this mutiny about at this tirrie--in the fac.e of the 
enemy. This writer advocates that the United Irishmen were responsible 
for this mutiny . It seems only reasonable to assume that, under 
ordinary conditions, the fleet would not mutiny since they had no 
grievances, but since they were disaffected they would mutiny . The timing 
of this mutiny is also important; it indicates, certainly, pre-planning. 
It is doubtful that the English fleet would be in cormnunicat ion with 
the French and know their plans for invasion; however, the United 
Irishmen were in cormnunication and thus they would know about any pl?ns 
the French would have for an invasion. Since the safety of the realm 
depended on the fleet and the fact that. the condition of the fleet would 
not be benefited if the French controlled England, it is the opinion 
of this writer that the United Irishmen influenced the Fleet at Yarmouth, 
because they would gain the most by French control of England. 
Meanwhile, in London the cabinet met and told the Admiralty to 
swallow its pride and send a board to Sheerness . A royal pardon was 
also granted to cover this situation. In the evening, Spencer, 
accompanied by two of his colleagues, Lord Arden and Admiral Young, set 
11 
out for Sheerness . By May 28, they arrived and set up their head-
12 
quarters at ColIDllissioner Hartwell's. Spencer then refused to receive 
any of the mutinous delegates and decided to use Admiral Buckner to 
11 Bryant, .££.· cit. • p. 195 .  
12M . d D b 
.. " t  55 an waring an o ree • £.12:• . .  c.1 � 1 p. 1 • 
communicate with the delegates, Parker then ref-used to make any kind 
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13 of a compromise, and he mistreated Spencer, who then left for London. 
As the writer pointed out, neither the government nor the 
delegates were willing to compromise, At this time the goverrunent 
decided to take new steps to stop the mutiny and bring the mutinous 
fleet back into line. ,The Pitt government then ordered: (a) all relations 
between the fleet and the army to cease and sailors ·were not to be per-
mitted to go ashore; (b) any intercourse with the mutinous seamen was 
punishable by death; (c) the provisions for the mutinous fleet were to 
14 
be stopped , At the same time, a proclamation was issued: 
, offering his majesty ' s  pardon to all such of the 
mutineers as should immediately return to duty; 
intimating, at the same time that Admiral Buckner was 15 the proper person to be applied to on such an occasion. · 
Needless to say, the stoppage of vitals to the fleet placed the 
mutineers in a very precarious position, but they could not turn back 
now. On June 2, the mutineers showed their power by stopping every 
ship entering or leaving the Thames river; however, this move only 
16 
served to unite the country against the mutinous men. The government 
retaliated against this move by the mutineers by : (a) reinforcing the 
garrison at Sheerness; (b) increasing the amount of shot in the forts 
along the Thames; (c) gunboats were fitted out; (d) and buoys were 
removed to trap the mutineers and to prevent their escape by sea.17 In 
fact, on the Swan, Readen, the president of the Committee, asked the 
pilot to take the ship to France or Ireland.18 The question now arises 
13Bryant, �· cit., p. 195, 
14rbid . 
15wirtbolt, �· cit., p. 101. 
l6Bryant, .2£.· cit. , p. 196. 
17Hunt, �· cit., p. 394. 
18i:.ianwaring and Dobree, E.E. •  cit., 
p. 208. 
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as to why a pat riot ic Engl ishman would want to surrender his ship to 
the French or the Irish ;  because it would not b ene fit him and it would 
hurt England, but it would benefit the Unit ed Irishmen and the ir caus e ,  
which was in oppos it ion to the Engl ish . 
On June 6 ,  the King ' s  govermnent dec lared the mutineers as rebel s ;  
however,  it still  extended the o ffer o f  a pardon t o  those who. would 
submit , Naturally,  the pardon excluded the r ingleaders  who must face 
the consequence o f  leading a mut iny against the government , Throughout 
this p eriod, a growing sp irit of discont ent existed among the mutineers , 
making the ir co llap s e  inevitable,  19 
At this t ime , Lord Northesk, who had been in confinement on the 
Montague , of which he had been the collllllander,  was requested to go to the 
King in the name o f  the mut ineers and make known the condit ions on which 
20 
they would surrender.  The following is a t ext of the p et it ion sent 
to London by the del egat e s :  
19 
To the King ' s  Most Excel lent Maj esty . 
May it p lease Your Maj esty, 
We your Maj e sty ' s  faithful and loyal sub j ects 
s e rv ing on Board Your Maj esty ' s  Ships and Ve ssels  at 
the Nor e ,  with the greatest humility beg leave to lay 
our Pet i t ion b e fore you, and hop e as you have always 
avowed yours e l f  to be the Father o f  your Peop l e ,  that 
our Petit ions will be attended to , We have already 
laid a state o f  our Grievance before Your Maj esty ' s  
Board o f  Achniralty, wh ich Grievances we have reasons 
to imagine ,  were never properly stated to you ,  as we 
are so rry to ha1Te reason to remark the conduct o f  
your p resent Ministers seems to b e  directed t o  the ruin 
and overthrow o f  your Kingdoms , and as the ir: · Duty to 
Bryant , � · cit , ,  p .  19 7 .  
2Dwinbo lt , �· cit . ,  p .  102.  
its  good and advantage, a part icular instance o f  
which i s  the Council they have given Your Maj esty 
with regard to us in proclaiming us Rebe ls , 
t raitors and Out laws . This Council  if  we had not 
b e en men part icularly attached to Your :Maj esty ' s  
sacred p erson and Government , moderat e  but firm in 
our demands ,  and resolved with our l ive s . to oppo se 
your enemies by land and sea, woul d  b e fore now 
have driven us to  some acts of Outrage and Revenge 
that might have shaken the very foundat ions o f  this 
K ingdom . We here give you a l ist of  our Grievance s ,  
wh ich l i s t  is  accompanied b y  a s imp le but t rue 
Stat ement of  the Reasons we have o f  demanding them, 
and after thus making our Wants known to Your Maj e s ty,  
we cannot longer ascribe a non-comp l iance with 
thos e Wants to Ministry, with you it now rests to  
. determine whether you wi ll  or will  not get a Redress 
of our S uffe r ing. Your maj esty may depend that in 
Y our Kingdom there is no more loyal and faithful 
Sub j ect than we are , but at the same t ime we must 
as sure Your Maj.e sty t ill all tho se disgrace ful 
Proclamat ions,  wh ich proscribe Out laws are contra­
dicted,  t ill  we have al l our Grievances redress ' d 
and t ill  we have the same supp ly from and connnunica­
t ions as usual with the shore , we shall consider 
ourselves masters of  Nore Shipping. We have already 
det ermined how to act , and should be extremely sorry 
we should be forced to repose in another country, 
wh ich must evidently be the · case if we are denounced 
as Out l aws in our 01·m . 
Your Maj e s ty ' s  Ministers seem to build their 
hop es on starving us into a comp liance ,  but this is  
a wrong idea.  We have as much Provis ions and Stores 
as wil l  last S ix Months . We are aware of their 
int ent ions,  and p rov ided against them, but were it 
the reve rse ,  and that we had but two days Provis ion s ,  
w e  would sooner die in that stat e  than give up the 
1 east art icle o f  our Demands . 
We shall t;rust to · Your Maj esty ' s  p rudence in 
chuseing such Councillors and Adv isors in the present 
and other affairs as will  have the goods o f  their 
Country in view, and not l ike the. present Ministers 
its  Destruct ion. And with respect to our own 
Gr ievanc e s ,  we shall allow 54 hours from 8 o ' clock 
on Wednesday June the 7th 1797  to know Your Maje sty ' s  
final answer.  We shal l likewise make known t o  our 
fel low-subj ects on shore the p art icul ars  o f  the 
Address  and Your Maj esty ' s  answer,  so as to j ust ify 
to them any Measure we may take in consequence o f  a 
Refusal . 
we remain, 
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With loyalty 
Your Maj e s ty ' s  dut iful 2 1  Sub j e c :t;s , SEAMEN AT T HE  NORE 
21Manwaring and Dob re e ,  2£.• c it . ,  pp . 205-206 . 
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When Northesk arrived in London, he was introduced to Geo rge III  
by Lord Spencer;  however, t h e  king could not help the mut inous fleet 
22 for h is minister ' s  pol icy had already been formulated.  
No mes sage was sent back to the mutineers , but the information 
they d id receive told them that the nat ion disapproved of the ir act ion. 
Ne edless to s ay,  this caused a great deal o f  consternat ion among the I 
delegates and several ships deserted.  Little  o r  no b loodshed occurred 
and co=unication on the Thames r iver could now be restored . During 
this int erlude, many violent struggles o ccurred between the mut inous 
·23 men and those loyal to the government . 
Captain Knight , on June 10,  was reques ted by the mut inous fleet 
to t ake the following not e  to George I I I :  
S i r ,  
W e  the ships ' comp any names in the margin ( a l l  
the ship s '  are named) t ake the l iberty o f  laying our 
p resent grievances b efore you b e ing resolved to 
invest you with full  power to have our unhappy affairs  
sett led b e ing determined not to  lay here any longer 
and have our enemies prejudice our beloved King and 
Country . We now be ing wil l ing at any t ime to meet 
our enemie s ,  and there ·is no doubt if  ever we do fal l  
in with an enemy t o  our loving King and Country there 
is no doubt but we wil l let them know that we are 
Englishmen and men ,.,hich are true to our Country . 
( i) That His Maj esty will  be p leas ed to give an 
indemni ficat ion for all  o ffences past 
s igned by His Maj esty • .  
( ii) That all Wage s and Bounty now due may be 
paid  up as usual. 
( iii) The Montague to be repaired or docked unless  
the Dutch fleet are at sea.  
( iv) That all the ship s '  company 1-.herever they 
are with the o fficers now on board may b e  
kept together and not s eparated . 
22winbolt, � ·  cit . ,  p .  102 .  
23 Ibid . , p .  103 . 
We wish the officers that are o ffensive to us may 
be sent els ewhere to serve . We pray that al l peop le 
of our sh ip s that may be taken up on suspic ion of 
be ing t raitors may have the same indulgence grant ed 
as we have . We pray most s incere ly that the Harines 
may have such encouragement as will sat is fy them. 
That al l men who may have des ert ed His Maj esty ' s  
s ervice prior to this date may be cal led in and 
pardoned. 
The above delivered in presence o f  all the o fficers 
by the company of the Montague request ing Captain 
Knight wi ll  speedily lay be.fore His Mo st Gracious 
Maje sty th is humb le request . 
Dat ed on board the Montague the 1 0th o f  June 179 7 .  
24 The Company o f  the Montague To Captain John Knight . 
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However,  the s ituation continued to become more dep lorab le for the 
mut ineers and by June 1 2 ,  only two sh ip s flew the red flag o f  mut iny . 
This was a far cry from the twenty-two which once flew the flag o f  mut iny. 
A reward of five-hundred was offered on June 14 for the capture o f  
Parke r ,  who was short ly the reaft er captured by o fficer Mott  and Flat t o f  
the Sandwich . 25 
When the Sandwich surrendered, Parker was handed over to the 
mil it ary authorities and j ailed at the Maidstone prison. It i s  interest -
ing t o  note  that some of  the ringleaders o f  this mutiny made their way 
to Calais,  France .  26 Undoubtedly th is would be a likely spot fo r the 
Unit ed Irishmen to go . 
A court mart ial was ordered on June 14, with Admiral S ir Thomas 
Pas l ey as p resident o f  the Board. The court mart ial started on June 23, 
24r.1anwaring and Dobree , .21?.• c it . ,  pp . 225- 226 . 
25 Ib i<l. , pp . 228-234. 
26 B ryant , �· c it . , p .  198 .  
on the Neptune,  and at nine -thirty on the morning o f  June 30,  Richard 
. 27 P arker was hanged from the yard-arm of the Sandwich . 
27Manwaring and Dobree, .£!?.• cit . , pp . 237 - 24 2 .  
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CHAPTER V 
AFTERMATH OF THE MUT INIES 
What co uld have been the result of  these mut inies i f  the who le 
Engl ish fleet had mut inied in the face of the French? To answer this 
que stion, we must understand how much England depended upon s ea power.  
England had , according to Mahan, the p rincip le  condit ions 
necessary for becoming a great sea power among the nations o f  Europe .  
H e  sites s ix condit ions necessary for this : (A) Geographical pos ition ; 
(B) Physical conformat ion; (C) Ext ent of  territory ; (D) Numb e r  o f  
1 
population; (E ) Character of  the people; (F) Character o f  the government . 
Engl and had all the se  par excel lence and she had proven h e r s e l f  as a 
s ea powe r s ince the days o f  the Armada and Francis  Drak e .  Mahan notes 
that : 
When the sea not only borders or surrounds , but 
also separat e s  a country into two or more part s ,  the 
control of it becomes not only des irab l e ,  but 
virtually nece ssary , 2 
By b e ing the master o f  the sea, Great Britain was ab le to bring 
about the destruction o f  France, of her co lonial system, denying 
neut rals the right to carry on trade with France ,  and by her ever 
p ersistent e fforts to de feat the spirit of  aggre s s ion which the French 
1 A . T .  Mahan, The Influence of Sea Power Upon History (Bo ston: 
Little,  Brown and Company, 1898) , pp . 28-29 . 
2 Ibid. , p .  40. 
so 
Revolut ion and Napoleon symbo lized drove France into the battle fie lds 
of the Cont inent , where the final downfall of the Revo lut ion and 
1 . 3 Napo eon was certain.  
The sea power o f  England not only brought about the downfall of  
the Revo lution and Napoleon, but it  also pac ified the  fears o f  the 
English concerning an invas ion, for without th is great confidence , the 
people o f  England would certainly have been disheartened . 4 
It is therefore the opinion o f  this wr iter,  and others , that sea 
power was the mo st important factor invo lved in determining the final 
outcome of the French Revolut ion and br inging about the downfa l l  of  
5 Napoleon Bonaparte .  
Without this sea power , which was great ly threatened by these  
mut inies , speculat ion can express end less cons iderat ions as  to what 
could have happened to England, and how history could have been altered - -
would there have been a battle of the Nile,  a Trafalgar , a Wat er loo , 
indeed an England . Needless to say ,  without sea powe r ,  England would 
not have had its finest hours in later years . Therefore,  it is the 
op inion of the writer that the mut inies at Nore and Sp ithead should b e  
given more att ent ion than most t extbooks devote to them .  
� The Influence o f  Sea Power Upon the French Revolut ion, ££.· c it . ,  
pp . 3 7 7 ,  400-401 .  
41.The Influence o f  Sea Power Upon .History , ££.· cit . ,  p .  1 2 .  
5The Influence of Sea Powe r Upon the French Revo lut ion , ££.· cit . ,  
pp . 3 7 1 - 3 7 2 .  
It can b e  said that 1797 marked a new era in the o rganizat ion 
o f  the English navy: (A) 1806 -A.B . ' s  increas e ,  a shil l ing a week in 
wages ; (B)  ordinary seamen, 6d . , a gradual increas e ,  1825 act for 
prompter payment ; (C)  s ick berth rat ings estab l ished in 1833- 1835 and 
no one ret ained in Navy for over 5 years against his wil l ;  (D) l835-
estab l ishment of register of  seamen --th is started the fading of  the 
system of impressment ; (E) 1834-0rder in Council a more  equitable 
distribut ion of pr iz e  money ; (F)  1836 - l ibraries were provided in s ea-
going ships ; (G) 1853-Cont inuous Service Act - - increas ed rat es  o f  pay 
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and other advantage s to men enter ing the s ervice for ten year s ;  (H) by 
1 828 a marked improvement in punishment ; ( I) 1860-Naval Discip l ine Act 
repealed the Art icle of War ; (J) Act of 1866 limit ed the number o f  
lashes a man mi ght receive to forty- e ight : ( 1879 -pract ical abo l it ion 
6 
o f  flogging in peace t ime ) . 
And so the English admirabllY learned that the seamen should b e  
treat ed a s  men and not as animals ; and the type of  o fficer who pers isted 
in the "on the kne e "  type att itude toward his men was a l iab il ity and 
7 not an asset . 
6M . d b 2 8 an war ing an Do ree,  .2.E..!_ cit . , pp . 5 7 - 25 • 
7 Ib id . ,  p .  255 . 
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APPENDIX A 
List o f  the Delegat es of the Fleet during the mut iny at Sp ith ead, 179 7 , Comp iled from the Muster Books o f  the various 
ships in the Pub lic Record Office . A man ' s  age is that at the t ime when he ent ered the ship , in most cas es in 1796 . 
Surname 
Joyce 
Morr ice 
Richardson 
Green 
Harding 
Ri ley 
Fleming 
Huddl e s tone 
Glynn 
Duggan 
Beth e l l  
Adams 
Anderson 
Allen 
Blythe 
Screaton 
Vas s i e  
B erry 
Clear 
Wilson 
Scrivener 
Porter 
Wh itney 
Gal laway 
Berwick 
Christ ian 
Name 
Valent ine 
John 
John 
Joseph 
Alexander 
William 
John 
John 
Patrick 
Patr ick 
John 
Michae l 
Will iam 
Thomas 
James 
Will iam 
John 
Char les 
George 
David 
John 
Wi ll iam 
John 
George 
James 
Ship 
Royal George 
Royal Sovereign 
London 
Queen Charlot t e  
Glory 
Duke 
Mars 
Mars 
Marlborough 
Ramil lies 
Robust 
' :""':� -. 
Impetueux 
D e fence 
Rat ing 
Quarter Master ' s  Mate 
A. B .  
A .  B ,  
A .  B .  
Gunner ' s  Mate 
Quarter Master 
A.  B .  
Yeoman of Sheets 
A, B .  
Midsh ipman 
Midsh ipman 
Quarter Gunner 
Quarter Master 
A .  B .  
A ,  B .  
A .  B .  
Yeoman o f  She ets 
Midsh ipman 
A .  B .  
Yeoman o f  Sheets 
Yeoman of Sheets 
Quarter Mast er 
A .  B .  
Midshipman 
Quarter Master 
Age 
25 
32 
26 
26 
23 
27 
25 
34 
34 
28 
33  
33  
33  
29 
30 
27 
27 
33 
25 
23 
3 1  
25 
24 
28 
30 
B irthplace 
Jersey 
Aberdeen 
Piltown 
York 
Greenock 
Westminster 
Glasgow 
Holvach 
Dub l in 
Waterford 
London 
Rochester 
Dublin 
Hart ley 
Northumber land 
Remarks 
Continued Q·.M.  ' s  Mate after Mut iny 
A .  B .  after Mut iny 
Master ' s  Mate, 1st Spet . 179 7 
Continued Q .  M .  after Mutiny 
Gunner ' s  Mat e,  1st S ept . 179 7 
Former ly Q .  M .  ' s  Mate 
Former ly Q. M .  ' s  Mate 
Formerly Boatswain ' s  Mate 
Formerly on H . M . S .  Veteran 
Mid , t i ll  9 th Mar , 1797 
Promoted Q.  M . ' s  Mat e ,  30th Sept . 1797 
Ash ridge , Yorks Promoted Mid . , 20th May 1 79 7 
London 
Lanark 
London 
Angmering 
Ipswich 
N. Shields 
Suffo lk 
America 
Co ldstream 
Westberry, 
Wilts 
A.  B .  t il l  1st Mar ,  1796 
Promoted Q .  M. ' s  Mat e ,  14th May 1797 
Vl 
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APPENDIX A (Cont inued) 
Surname Christ ian Ship Rating Age B irthp lace Remarks Name 
Turner Mark T errible Midshipman 37 Harwich Serv"ing as Mid . at least a year 
be for e the Mutiny 
Salke ld  George - - - Yeoman o f  Powder Room 39 Wa ls ingham An old salt . Had been Y .  o f  P . R .  
for four years . Made Gunner ' s  
Mat e ,  1 s t  Jan . 179 8 .  
Potts  Wil l iam La Pompe e  Quarter Mas ter 24 Harthy 
Me lvin James - - - Quarter Mas ter 34 Sunderland Q .  M . ' s  Mat e  t i l l  8th Mar .  1797 
Lawler Denis Minotaur Quarter Gunner 34 Kildare 
Cross land George - - - A .  B .  31  Thorn 
Saunders John De fiance A .  B .  33  Pembrokeshire 
Husband John - - - A.  B .  27  Whitby 
1 Manwar ing and Dobree , .££ · cit . ,  pp . 26 2-26 3 .  't 
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APPENDIX B 
PETITION OF THE SEAMEN TO THE ADMIRALTY 
To the Right Honourab le the Lords Connnis s ioners o f  the Admira lty . 
Hy Lords , 
We , the seamen o f  h is maj esty ' s  navy, take the liberty o f  address ing 
your lordships in an humble pet it ion, shewing the many hardships and 
oppress ions we have laboured under for many year s ,  and wh ich , we hope ,  your 
l ordsh ips wil l  redress as soon as pos s ible . We flatter ourselves that your 
lordship s ,  together with the nation in general,  wil l  acknowledge our worth 
and good service s ,  both in the American war, as we l l  as the present;  for 
wh ich good service your lordships pet itioners do unanimously agree in 
opinion, that the ir worth to the nat ion , and laborious industry in de fence 
o f  the ir country , de serve some better encouragement than that we meet with 
at present , or from any we have experience d .  We , your petit ioners, do not 
b o ast our good services , fo r any other purpose than that o f  putt ing you and 
the nat ion in mind o f  the respect due to us , nor do we ever int end to  
deviat e  from our former character; so far from any thing o f  that kind, or  
that an Engl ishman or men should turn their coat s,  we l ikewise agree in 
op inion, that we should suffer doub le the hardships we have hiterto 
exp e rienced, b e fore we would wish the crown o f  England to be in the least 
imposed upon b e  that o f  any other power in the world; we there fore beg leave 
t o  inform your lordship s  of the grievance s  wh ich we at present labour under .  
We , your humb le p et itioners, relying that your lordships wil l  t ake 
into early considerat ion the grievances of which we comp lain ,  and do not 
in the l east doubt but your lordships wil l  comp ly with our de sires , wh ich 
are every way reas onab l e .  
The first grievance we have to comp l ain o f ,  i s ,  that our wages are 
too low, and ought to be raised,  that we might be the better ab le to 
support our wive s  and famil ies in a manner comfortab l e ,  and whom we are 
in duty bound to support , as far as our wage s wil l  allow; which ,  we t rust , 
wi l l  b e  looked into by your lordships and the honourab le house o f  commons 
in par liament as s emb led.  
He , your pet i t ioners,  beg that your lordships wil l  t ake into cons id­
erat ion the grievances of wh ich we comp lain,  and now lay b e fore you .  
F irst , That our provis ions b e  raised t o  the weight o f  s ixteen 
o unces to the pound, and o f  a better qual ity; and that our measures may be 
the same as those  used in the commercial trade of this count ry .  
S e condly, That your pet it ioners request your honours wil l  b e  pleased 
t o  obs e rv e ,  the re should be no flour served while  we are in harbour, in 
any port whatever, under the command of the Brit ish flag; and also , that 
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there might be grant ed a sufficient quantity o f  vegetables,  o f  such 
k ind as may be the mo st p lent i ful in the port s to which we go ; which we 
grievously comp lain and lay under the want o f .  
Thirdly, That your lordships wi ll  b e  p leased serious ly to look 
into the state o f  the s ick on board his maj esty ' s  ship s ,  that they may 
be better attended to , and that they may have the use o f  such neces saries 
as are allowed for them in time of s ickness ; and that these necessaries 
be not on any account embezzled. 
Fourthly, That your lordships wil l b e  so k ind as to look into th is 
affair, which is nowise unreasonab le; and that we may be looked upon as 
a number o f  men standing in de fence o f  our count ry ; and that we may in 
somewise have grant and opportunity to taste the sweets o f  l iberty on shore,  
wh en in any harbour, and when we have completed the duty o f  our ship , after 
our return from sea:  And that no man may encroach upon his  l iberty , there 
shall be a boundary l imit ed ,  and those trespas s ing any furthe r,  without 
a wr itten order from the commanding o fficer, shall:b.e punished according t o  
the rules o f  the navy ; wh ich i s  a natural request,  and congenial t o  the 
heart o f  man, and certainly to us , that you make the boast o f  being the 
guard ians o f  the land . 
F i fthly, That i f  any man is wounde d  in act ion , his pay may b e  
cont inued t i l l  h e  is  cured and di scharged; and if any ship has any real 
grievances to comp lain o f ,  we hope your lordships wil l readily address 
them, as far as in your power, to prevent disturbances .  
It is  also unanimous ly agre ed by the flee t ,  that , from this day, no 
grievances  shall b e  received, in order to convince the nat ion at l arge , 
that we know when to ceas e to ask, as wel l  as to begin,  and that we ask 
nothing but what is moderat e ,  and may be granted without detriment to the 
nat ion, or any·'. inj ury to the service . 
Given on board the Queen Charlott e ,  by the delegat es o f  the fleet , 
the 18th day o f  Apr il 1797 • .  
2Ibid. , pp . 26 5 - 266 . 
(S igned by the de legates named in Appendix A,  
with the except ion o f  John Fleming, who 
had not yet been e lected . )  
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APPENDIX C 
"The Dying Declarat ion o f  the late unfortunate Richard Parker, 
written two days previous to his execut ion, in a letter to a person who 
had known him from his earliest in fancy . "  
June 28th , 179 7 .  
Dear S ir ,  
In my awful situat ion I have great conso lation t o  find that I st i l l  
pos sess your est eem, and merit your collllllis erat ion. Heaven grant you may 
long out l ive the painful reco llect ion o f  my unfo rtunate fat e .  A little 
while and I must depart from this world, and for ever clos e my eyes 
upon it s vanity, deceit fulnes s ,  and ingrat itude . My passage through it 
has been short but checquered . My departure from it will be extremely 
boisterous,  but I s erious ly assure you, upon my part , by no means unwilling. 
The only comfort ab le reflect ion that I at present enj oy, is that I 
am to die a Martyr in the cause of Humanity . I know the mult itude think 
hard things o f  me , but this gives me no uneas ine s s ,  for my conscience 
test i fies that the p art wh ich I have acted among the seamen has been right , 
although not to be justi fied by prudence . The latter considerat ion is the 
only compunction which I feel under my do leful calamity.  Yes,  prudence 
urges that I ought to have known mankind better, than b l indfold to have  
p lunged into certain de struction. Long since I had learnt that the 
miseries under which the lower c las ses groan are imputab le in a great 
measure to their ignorance ,  cowardice,  and dup licity,  and that nothing 
short o f  a miracle would ever afford them any relief. This expe r ience,  
prudence too late teaches me should have been my guard against that fat al 
error wh ich forfeits my l i fe .  However severe this reflection, st il l I 
preoerve my fort itude , and am enabled to do this by cons idering that as 
a human being I stand subj ect to human pass ion, the noblest of which is a 
tender sensib ility at every species o f  human woe .  Thus influenced,  how 
could I indi fferent ly stand by, and beho ld some of the best o f  my fel low 
not ,  and because I could not , fate consigns me to be a v ict im o f  the 
t enderest emo t ions o f  the human heart . 
Upon the word o f  a dying man, I solemnly dec lare that I was not an 
original mover o f  the disturbances amongst  those men, who have t reat ed me 
so very ungrat e fully. .  Also,  that I was e lected by my Shipmate s  their 
Delegat e without my knowledge , and in the same manner by the Del egates 
their Pres ident . I was compelled to accept tho se s ituat ions much against 
my inclinations by those who pushed me into them, and I d id hy no means 
attain them in the manner which has been scandalously reported by persons 
who are purposely prejudiced or ignorant o f  the matter.  It ' is  we ll known 
what authority the s eamen had over the ir De legat e s ,  and in what a 
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ferocious manner the Delegate s  were frequently treated for not according 
with every wild scheme which the sai lors propo sed to carry into pract ice . 
I further de clare that from the aggregat e body originated every p lan, 
and that during the t ime the Delegat es held their peri.lous situations ,  
that always act ed pursuant to , and obeyed the instruct ions o f  their 
const ituent s .  How I and my unfortunat e colleagues have been rewarded 
for our fidel ity in thus acting, those who have any sense o f  mo ral 
ob ligation will  eas ily det ermine . The only instances in which the 
Delegat es  acted o f  themse lves were in those of checking the vio lence and 
turpitude o f  their masters,  and this God knows we had hard work to do , 
but considering all circumstances,  thos e  who know anyth ing of sailors 
will readily al low that we preserved much better orde r than could 
reasonably have been exp ect ed upon such an o ccas ion . For not according 
with the prepost erous ideas o f · the seamen, I and many more must suffer 
Death . Had we been as decidedly violet as they were , we need not have 
d ied like dogs,  for all the fo rce which could have been must ered would 
not have availed, and necess ity would have obliged a comp l iance to our 
demands . Owing to the Delegates moderat ion, they hav e  been overcome, 
and for my O \·m part I cheerfully forgive the vanquishers the b l oody use 
they intend to make of their victory; perhaps it is po licy in them to 
do it . From the f irst moment that I understood the kindnes s which the 
Delegates  were to exp erience from their emp loyers ,  I was prepared for the 
sacrifice, and may Heaven grant that I may be the last victim o ffered up 
in the cause o f  a treacherous and debased conunonalty.  Many wil l  ask, 
however, how an ins ign i ficant man l ike mys e l f  could merit the confidence 
o f  the Mult itude , so far as to induce them to thrust h im  forward upon 
such an occas ion. I f  such enquirers wil l  for a moment re flect that in a 
popular commot ion any person who has the mi s fortune to be in reput e for 
a trifl ing share o f  abi l ity is l iab le to be forced into act ion though 
much against his wil l ,  their enquiry will easily b e  solved, and this was 
p recisely my case . Others will say,  how could a man o f  his  in format ion 
be s o  indiscreet? Tel l  such that Richard Parker in his last moment s was 
p ierced to the bottom o f  his souL.with asking hims e l f  the same que st ion.  
That he ingenuous ly owned he was indis creet , but that it was , as he 
thought , from laudab l e  mot ives . 
At the pre s s ing app l icat ions o f  my brother shipmat e s ,  I suffered 
humanity to surmount reason, and I hope my life is a suff ic ient atonement 
for my folly.  I am the devoted scapegoat for the s ins of  many , and 
hence forth when the oppres sed groan under the st ripes o f  the oppres sors , 
let my examp l e  deter any man from risking hims e l f  as the v ict im to 
ame liorate their wretchednes s .  Having said thus much of my concerns 
with the seamen, I shal l now take the liberty to o ffer my friend  some 
adv ic e .  I t  i s  the re sult o f  dear bought experience s ,  and I hop e h e  will 
p ro fit by it . Remember, never to make yours e l f  the busy body o f  the lower 
c las s e s ,  for they are cowardly, s e l fish , and ungrat e ful;  the least 
t r i fle will intimidat e them,: ,  and him whom they have exalted one moment 
as the ir Demagogue, the next they will  not scrup le  to exalt upon the 
gallows . I own it is with pain that I make such a remark t o  you, but 
t ruth demands it . I have exp er imentally prove d  it , and very soon am to 
59 
b e  made the examp le o f  it . There is nothing new in my treatment ; compare 
it with the treatment o f  mo st o f  the Advocates for the improvement o f  
the conditions o f  the Mult itude in all  age s .  Nay with reverence I 
wri t e  it , with the tre atment of Jesus Christ  Himself when on earth, and 
then declare whe ther or  not my advice i s  to b e  regarded, 
It  is my op inion that if Government had not been too hasty the 
Port smouth Mutiny would have been as readily overcome as that at Sheerne s s .  
A very trifl ing forbearance o n  their part would have occas ioned the 
Portsmouth De legate s  to have been de l iv ered up l ike those at Sheernes s,  
to have set tled all th e  account s .  This is not mere supposit ion, but 
founded upon fact s ,  though not general ly known. The Mut ineers have been 
accus ed of dis loyalty, but it is a fal se  accusat ion . They were only so 
to their i l l - fated tools the Del egat e s . Both Army and Navy are in my 
op inion loyal,  and s e t t ing as ide the l iberties �vhich they have late ly t aken 
with the ir superior s ,  we l l  att ached to the ruling power s .  The ignorant 
and the vio lent will call  me a criminal, but when it is remembered what 
we re the demands which I made for my unp rin c ip led emp loyers , I know the 
discreet part o f  mankind wil l  acquit me o f  criminality.  I have reason 
t o  th ink the Civ il Power would have acquitted me , but by the Articles 
of War my destruct ion was irreniidiab l e ,  and o f  this Government was we ll  
aware ,  o r  I should not have been tried by  a Court Martial .  By the Laws 
o f  War I acknowledge mys e l f  to b e  legal ly convicted, but by the Laws of 
Humanity, which should b e  the bas is of al l laws , I die il legal ly. My 
j udges were respectab l e ,  but not total ly' disinterested,  !for one o f  the 
demands had for it s t endency the abridgement of their emo luments in Prize 
Money . 
Now my dear Friend, I take my l eave of you, and may Prov idence amp ly 
return every kindness  that I have rece ived from your hands . Oh, pray 
for me , that in the last s cene I may act my part l ike a man, and that when 
I am on the po int o f  b e ing o ffered up , that I may be insp ired with a 
charity suffic ient to forgive tho se  for whom I am sacr i ficed. The moment 
my body is suspended the spectators wil l  beho ld a wretch who is exposed 
t o  them as an examp le of h is own frailty, and o f  the disgrace and dishonour 
o f  those men for whom I met so ignominous a death . Parting with l i fe 
i s  no more than going to  s leep , and God in His mercy grant I may s leep 
sweet ly after my worldly t o i l s ,  through the merits of my Lord and S avior 
Jesus Chr ist .  Amen .  
3rb id . , pp . 273- 276 . 
Ad ieu, eternally adieu, 
From your dying fr iend, 
Richard Parker .  
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APPENDIX D 
List o f  H .  M. ' s  Ship s and Vessels  concerned in the Mutiny at the Nore, 
179 7 ,  with the mnnber,s Court Mart ial led.  Comp i led from three l ists  bound 
up with the Rough Minute s  of the Board o f  Admiralty, June 179 7 .  (Ad . 3/ 137 . )  
Shi)2 I s  Name Number S ent enced to Death Executed F logged Irri12risoned Pardoned 
C-M 
Sandwich 25 15 6 2 9 
Montague 16 9 4 6 4 
Director 12 1 2  
Inflexible 41 41 
Monmouth 51 11 6 4 4 29 
Standard 28 10 3 3 7 15 
B e l l iqueux 3 2 
Lion 46 46 
Nass au 20 19 
Repulse 6 4 
Grampus 6 5 3 1 
Pro serp ine 7 7 
B r i ll iant 14 13 
Iris 2 (Not e :  "Both have deserted")  -
Champion 22 22  
Comet (General pardon fo r the who le of the crew. ) 
Tys iphone 1 1  1 1  
Py lade s 8 8 
Swan 11  11  
Lancaster (General pardon for the whol e  o f  the crew. ) 
Inspector 9 5 
Vest al 7 7 
Isis  (Ordered to be t ried at Portsmouth . ) - 42 
Leopard 41 9 7 2 32  
Agamemmon 13 13 
Ranger 13 1 2  
Tot al 41 2 59 29 9 29 
Note . - -The f loggings ranged from 40 to 380 lashes, the lat t er being 
infl icted on a seaman o f  the Morunouth; the imprisonment from one to eight 
years . The numb er o f  pardons are those given in an Admiralty do cument , 
dated 16 Dec.  179 7 ,  and would inc lude those pardoned after the battle o f  
Camperdown (Ad . 3/ 137 ) . Thomas Mccann, o f  the S andwich , one o f  those 
sentenced to death, had h is s entence commut ed to t ransportat ion for l ife . 
4Ibid.  , p .  27 7 .  
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